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Abstract
We present necessary conditions for linear noncooperative N-player
delta dynamic games on a generic time scale. Necessary conditions for
an open-loop Nash-equilibrium and for a memoryless perfect state Nash-
equilibrium are proved.
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1 Introduction
In 1988 Stephan Hilger developed in his PhD thesis [8] the theory of time scales.
The set R of real numbers and the set Z of integers are (trivial) examples of
time scales. When a result is proved in a general time scale T, one unifies both
continuous and discrete analysis. Moreover, since there are infinitely many
other time scales, a much more general result is proved. For this reason, one
can say that the two main features of the theory of time scales are unification
and extension.
Differential game theory is a relatively new area of Mathematics, initiated in
the fifties of the XX century with the works of Rufus Isaacs, that founds many
applications in different fields such as economics, politics, and artificial intelli-
gence. The theory has been studied in the context of classical Mathematics, in
discrete or continuous time [1, 11]. We trust that it is also possible (with some
advantages) to present (delta) differential games in the generic context of time
∗Partially presented at the Fifth Symposium on Nonlinear Analysis (SNA 2007), Torun´,
Poland, September 10-14, 2007.
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scales. To the best of the authors knowledge, this paper represents the first
attempt to provide a delta differential game theory on a generic time scale.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic def-
initions and results from the calculus on time scales. In Section 3, necessary
conditions for a weak local minimizer of a Lagrange problem on time scales
(Theorem 3) are presented, while Section 4 recalls a result that guarantees the
uniqueness of the forward solution for a special initial valued problem on time
scales (Theorem 7). In Section 5 we introduce the definition of a N -player delta
differential game, the notion of Nash-equilibrium, and two types of informa-
tion structure in a game: open-loop and memoryless perfect state. The main
results of the paper appear then in Section 6, where necessary conditions for
a linear open-loop Nash-equilibrium and for a linear memoryless perfect state
Nash-equilibrium are proved.
2 Calculus on time scales
We briefly present here the necessary concepts and results from the theory of
time scales (cf. [3, 4, 9] and references therein). As usual, R, Z and N denote,
respectively, the set of real, integer, and natural numbers.
A time scale T is an arbitrary nonempty closed subset of R. Thus, R, Z and
N are examples of times scales. Other examples of times scales can be hZ, for
some h > 0, [1, 4]
⋃
N, or the Cantor set. We assume that a time scale T has
the topology that it inherits from the real numbers with the standard topology.
The forward jump operator σ : T→ T is defined by
σ(t) = inf {s ∈ T : s > t}
if t 6= supT and σ(supT) = supT. The backward jump operator ρ : T → T is
defined by
ρ(t) = sup {s ∈ T : s < t}
if t 6= inf T and ρ(inf T) = inf T.
A point t ∈ T is called right-dense, right-scattered, left-dense or left-scattered
if σ(t) = t, σ(t) > t, ρ(t) = t or ρ(t) < t, respectively.
The graininess function µ : T→ [0,∞) is defined by
µ(t) = σ(t)− t, for all t ∈ T.
For a given instant t, µ(t) measures the distance of t to its right neighbor.
It is clear that when T = R, then for any t ∈ R, σ(t) = t = ρ(t) and µ = 0.
When T = Z, for any t ∈ Z, σ(t) = t+ 1, ρ(t) = t− 1, and µ = 1.
In order to introduce the definition of delta derivative, we define the set
T
k := {t ∈ T : t is nonmaximal or left-dense} .
Thus, Tk is obtained from T by removing its maximal point if this point exists
and is left-scattered.
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We say that a function f : T→ R is delta differentiable at t ∈ Tk if there is
a number f∆(t) such that for all ε > 0 there exists a neighborhood U of t (i.e.,
U =]t− δ, t+ δ[∩T for some δ > 0) such that
|f(σ(t)) − f(s)− f∆(t)(σ(t) − s)| ≤ ε|σ(t)− s|, for all s ∈ U.
We call f∆(t) the delta derivative of f at t. Moreover, we say that f is delta
differentiable on Tk provided f∆(t) exists for all t ∈ Tk.
We note that when T = R, then f : R→ R is delta differentiable at t ∈ R if
and only if
f∆(t) = lim
s→t
f(t)− f(s)
t− s
exists, i.e. if and only if f is differentiable in the ordinary sense at t. When
T = Z, then f : Z→ R is always delta differentiable at t ∈ Z and
f∆(t) =
f(σ(t)) − f(t)
σ(t) − t
= f(t+ 1)− f(t) .
Hence, for T = Z the delta derivative of f , f∆, coincides with the usual forward
difference ∆f .
It is clear that if f is constant, then f∆ = 0; if f(t) = kt for some constant
k, then f∆ = k.
For delta differentiable functions f and g, the next formulas hold:
fσ(t) = f(t) + µ(t)f∆(t) ,
(fg)∆(t) = f∆(t)gσ(t) + f(t)g∆(t)
= f∆(t)g(t) + fσ(t)g∆(t),
where we abbreviate f ◦ σ by fσ.
Delta derivatives of higher order are defined in the standard way: we define
the rth-delta derivative (r ∈ N) of f to be the function f∆
r
: Tk
r
→ R, provided
f∆
r−1
is delta differentiable on Tk
r
:=
(
T
kr−1
)k
.
The class of continuous functions on T is too small for a convenient theory
of integration. For our purposes, it is enough to define the notion of integral in
the class of rd-continuous functions. For a more general theory of integration
on time scales, we refer the reader to [4]. A function f : T → R is called rd-
continuous if it is continuous at right-dense points and if its left-sided limit exists
(finite) at left-dense points. For T = R rd-continuity coincides with continuity.
We denote the set of all rd-continuous functions f : T → R by Crd(T,R),
and the set of all delta differentiable functions with rd-continuous derivative by
C1rd(T,R).
It can be shown that every rd-continuous function f possess an antideriva-
tive, i.e. there exists a function F with F∆ = f , and in this case the delta
integral is defined by∫ b
a
f(t)∆t := F (b)− F (a) for all a, b ∈ T.
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This integral has the following property:∫ σ(t)
t
f(τ)∆τ = µ(t)f(t) .
Let a, b ∈ T and f ∈ Crd(T,R). It is easy to prove that
1. for T = R,
∫ b
a
f(t)∆t =
∫ b
a
f(t)dt, where the integral on the right hand
side is the usual Riemann integral;
2. for T = Z,
∫ b
a
f(t)∆t =
∑b−1
t=a f(t) if a < b,
∫ b
a
f(t)∆t = 0 if a = b, and∫ b
a
f(t)∆t = −
∑a−1
t=b f(t) if a > b.
Next, we present the integration by parts formulas: if a, b ∈ T and f, g ∈
Crd(T,R), then
1.
∫ b
a
f(σ(t))g∆(t)∆t = [(fg)(t)]
t=b
t=a −
∫ b
a
f∆(t)g(t)∆t;
2.
∫ b
a
f(t)g∆(t)∆t = [(fg)(t)]
t=b
t=a −
∫ b
a
f∆(t)g(σ(t))∆t.
Similarly to classical calculus, we say that f : T → Rn is a rd-continuous
function if each component of f , fi : T → R, is a rd-continuous function. The
set of all such functions is denoted by Crd(T,R
n). The set C1rd(T,R
n) is defined
in the usual way.
3 Lagrange problem on time scales
Let a, b ∈ T such that a < b. In what follows we denote by [a, b] the set
{t ∈ T : a ≤ t ≤ b}. Consider the following Lagrange problem with delta
differential side condition:
J [x(·), u(·)] =
∫ b
a
L(t, x(t), u(t))∆t −→ min ,
x∆(t) = ϕ(t, x(t), u(t)) , t ∈ Tk ,
x(a) = xa ,
(1)
where we assume that
• L : T × Rn × Rm → R, ϕ : T × Rn × Rm → Rn, (x, u) → L(t, x, u) and
(x, u)→ ϕ(t, x, u) are C1-functions of x and u for each t;
• x(·) ∈ C1rd(T,R
n) and u(·) ∈ Crd(T,R
m), m ≤ n;
• for each control function u(·) there exists a unique forward solution x(·)
of the initial value problem x∆(t) = ϕ(t, x(t), u(t)), x(a) = xa.
1
1In the linear case, conditions guaranteing the existence and uniqueness of forward solutions
are easy to obtain [2] – cf. Section 4.
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We borrow from [7] the definition of admissible pair and the definition of
weak local minimizer for problem (1). The reader interested in the calculus of
variations on time scales is referred to [5, 6] and references therein.
Definition 1. The pair (x∗(·), u∗(·)) is said to be admissible for problem (1) if
1. x∗(·) ∈ C
1
rd(T,R
n) and u∗(·) ∈ Crd(T,R
m);
2. x∆∗ (t) = ϕ(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)) and x∗(a) = xa.
In order to introduce the notion of weak local minimizer for problem (1), we
define the following norms in Crd(T,R
n) and C1rd(T,R
n):
||y||∞ := sup
t∈T
‖ y(t) ‖ , y ∈ Crd(T,R
n) ,
and
||z||1,∞ := sup
t∈Tk
‖ z(t) ‖ + sup
t∈Tk
‖ z∆(t) ‖ , z ∈ C1rd(T,R
n) ,
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm in Rn.
Definition 2. An admissible pair (x∗(·), u∗(·)) is said to be a weak local mini-
mizer for problem (1) if there exists r ∈ R+ such that
J [x∗(·), u∗(·)] ≤ J [x(·), u(·)]
for all admissible pairs (x(·), u(·)) satisfying
‖ x− x∗ ‖1,∞ + ‖ u− u∗ ‖∞< r.
Theorem 3 gives necessary conditions for a pair (x∗(·), u∗(·)) to be a weak
local minimizer of the Lagrange problem (1).
Theorem 3 ([7]). If (x∗(·), u∗(·)) is a weak local minimizer of problem (1), then
there exists a multiplier ψ∗(·) : T → R
n that is delta differentiable on Tk, such
that
x∆∗ (t) = Hψσ (t, x∗(t), u∗(t), ψ
σ
∗ (t)) ,
ψ∆∗ (t) = −Hx(t, x∗(t), u∗(t), ψ
σ
∗ (t)) ,
Hu(t, x∗(t), u∗(t), ψ
σ
∗ (t)) = 0 ,
ψ∗(b) = 0 ,
(2)
for all t ∈ Tk, where the Hamiltonian function H is defined by
H(t, x, u, ψσ) := L(t, x, u) + ψσ · ϕ(t, x, u) . (3)
Remark 4. From definition (3) of the Hamiltonian function H, it follows that
the first condition in (2) holds for any admissible pair (x∗(·), u∗(·)) of problem
(1).
Remark 5. For the time scale T = R, Theorem 3 is a particular case of Pon-
tryagin’s Maximum Principle [12].
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4 Linear systems on times scales
Let us consider the following initial value problem on a time scale T:{
x∆(t) = Ax(t) + f(t) ,
x(a) = xa ,
(4)
where A is a constant n × n matrix, f : T → Rn is a rd-continuous function,
a ∈ T and xa ∈ R
n.
Similar to control theory [2], in dynamic game theory we are interested in
forward solutions. The purpose of this section is to present conditions assuring
problem (4) to have a unique forward solution.
Proposition 6 ([3]). The initial value problem{
x∆(t) = Ax(t) ,
x(a) = xa ,
where A is a constant n× n matrix, a ∈ T and xa ∈ R
n, has a unique forward
solution.
The matrix exponential function (also known as the fundamental matrix
solution) at a for the matrix A, is defined as the unique forward solution of the
matrix differential equation
X∆(t) = AX(t),
with the initial condition X(a) = I, where I denotes the n× n identity matrix.
Its value at t is denoted by eA(t, a).
Theorem 7 (cf. [2]). The initial value problem (4) has a unique forward solu-
tion of the form
x(t) = eA(t, a)xa +
∫ t
a
eA(t, σ(s))f(s)∆s .
5 N-player delta differential games
The (classical) term “N -player dynamic game” is applied to a group of problems
in applied mathematics that possess certain characteristics related with conflict
problems. The main ingredients in aN -player dynamic game are the players, the
control variables, the state variables, and the cost functionals/functions. The
relation between state and control variables is given by a differential/difference
equation. Two types of games can be considered: cooperative or noncooperative
games. In this paper we shall restrict ourselves to noncooperative games. In a
noncooperative game the players act independently in the pursuit of their own
best interest, each player desiring to attain the smallest possible cost.
Following Jank [10] (see also [1]), we introduce the notion of a N -player delta
differential game (noncooperative dynamic game in the context of time scales).
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Definition 8. Let N ∈ N. We say that
ΓN = (T , X, Ui,Ui, σi, f, xa, η
i, J i)i=1,2,...,N
is a N -player delta differential game if:
1. T is a closed nonempty interval of T (T is called the time horizon);
2. X is a finite dimensional Euclidean space (X is called the state or phase
space);
3. Ui is a finite dimensional Euclidean space (Ui is called the control value
space of the i-th player);
4. σi is a subset of a set of mappings
{γi|γi : T × P(X)→ Ui}
(γi is called a strategy of the i-th player while σi is called the set of
possible strategies of the i-th player);
5. x is a mapping from T to X (x is called the state variable);
6. ηi : T → P(X) is a mapping with the property
ηi(t) ⊆ {x(s) | a ≤ s ≤ t}
(ηi is called the information structure of the i-th player);
7. Ui = {γ
i(·, ηi(·)) | γi ∈ σi} (Ui is called the control space or decision set
of the i-th player);
8. f : T ×X×U1× · · ·×UN → X is a mapping that describes an outer force
acting on the system by the delta differential equation
x∆(t) = f(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t))
with the initial condition x(a) = xa ∈ X (u
i ∈ Ui is called the control
function or control variable of the i-th player);
9. J i is a mapping from U1 × · · · × UN to R (J
i is called the cost functional
of the i-th player).
Remark 9. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the controls ui(·) = γi(·, ηi(·)) ∈ Ui are
built up from chosen strategies γi with a specific information structure ηi.
Remark 10. The cost functional J i of the i-th player, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, de-
pends on the controls of all the N players.
Definition 11. A N -tuple of control functions u(·) = (u1(·), . . . , uN(·)) is called
an admissible control for the system ΓN if u is a rd-continuous function and
there exists a unique forward solution x ∈ C1rd(T , X) of the initial value problem
x∆(t) = f(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)), x(a) = xa.
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We shall consider the following equilibrium concept in a N -player delta dif-
ferential game.
Definition 12. A decision N -tuple u∗ = (u
1
∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) ∈ U1× · · · ×UN is called
a Nash-equilibrium if for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
J i(u1∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) ≤ J
i(u1∗, . . . , u
i−1
∗ , u
i, ui+1∗ , . . . , u
N
∗ )
for all ui ∈ Ui.
The meaning of the Nash-equilibrium is the following: if the i-th player
unilaterally change the strategy ui∗, then his cost will increase.
We remark that the information available to the players is an important
aspect of the game. In this paper we consider open-loop and memoryless perfect
state information structures.
Definition 13. Let ΓN be a N -player delta differential game. We say that ΓN
has
1. Open-loop (OL) information structure if ηi(t) = {xa}, t ∈ T , for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N};
2. Memoryless perfect state (MPS) information structure if ηi(t) = {xa, x(t)},
t ∈ T , for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Therefore, in the open-loop information structure each player know only the
initial position xa, while in the memoryless perfect state information structure
each player know the phase state x(t) at each time instant t as well as the initial
position xa.
Definition 14. We say that a control ui(t) := γi(t, ηi(t)) is: (i) an OL control,
if the information structure ηi is OL; (ii) a MPS control, if the information
structure ηi is MPS.
6 Main results
Using Theorem 3, we deduce necessary conditions for OL and MPS Nash-
equilibrium of N -player games with linear delta differential equations. We deal
with cost delta-integral functionals of the following type:
J i(u1, . . . , uN) =
∫ b
a
Li(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t))∆t , (5)
where we suppose the following (from now on, T denotes T ∩ [a, b]):
• for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , Li : T×Rn×Rm1×. . .×RmN → R is a C1-function
of x and u = (u1, . . . , uN ) for each t; max{m1, . . . ,mN} ≤ n;
• for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , ui ∈ Ui is admissible;
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• x is the forward solution of the delta differentiable initial value problem{
x∆(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) + · · ·+BNuN(t) ,
x(a) = xa ,
(6)
where A is a constant n× n matrix, and for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , Bi is a
constant n×mi matrix.
Remark 15. Since each ui ∈ Crd(T,R
mi), and therefore B1u1 + · · · + BNuN
is a rd-continuous function, by Theorem 7 the initial value problem (6) has a
unique forward solution.
Theorem 16 (Necessary conditions for a linear OL Nash-equilibrium). Let ΓN
be a N -player delta differential game, where the cost functional of the i-th player
is given by (5). If the decision N -tuple (u1∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) is an OL Nash-equilibrium
of ΓN , and if x∗ is the associated trajectory of the state, then there exist delta
differentiable functions ψi : T→ Rn on Tk, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , such that for
Hi(t, x, u1, . . . , uN , (ψi)σ) := Li(t, x, u1, . . . , uN )+(ψi)σ·(Ax+B1u1+· · ·+BNuN )
one has:
1. x∆∗ (t) = H
i
(ψi)σ (t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t));
2. x∗(a) = xa;
3. (ψi)∆(t) = −Hix(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t));
4. ψi(b) = 0;
5. Hiui(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) = 0;
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N and t ∈ Tk.
Proof. Suppose that the decisionN -tuple (u1∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) is an OL Nash-equilibrium
of ΓN and x∗ is the associated trajectory of the state. For each i = 1, . . . , N
consider the functional
J˜ i : Ui → R
defined by
J˜ i(ui) := J i(u1∗, . . . , u
i−1
∗ , u
i, ui+1∗ , . . . , u
N
∗ ).
Define also
f(x, u1, . . . , uN) := Ax+B1u1 + · · ·+BNuN .
Since (u1∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) is a Nash-equilibrium, then for all u
i ∈ Ui
J˜ i(ui∗) ≤ J˜
i(ui).
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Therefore, (x∗(·), u
i
∗(·)) is a weak local minimizer of the problem
J˜ i(ui) −→ min ,
x∆(t) = f˜(x(t), ui(t)) ,
x(a) = xa ,
(7)
where f˜(x, ui) := f(x, u1∗, . . . , u
i−1
∗ , u
i, ui+1∗ , . . . , u
N
∗ ). Define
Hi(t, x, ui, (ψi)σ) := Hi(t, x, u1∗, . . . , u
i−1
∗ , u
i, ui+1∗ , . . . , u
N
∗ , (ψ
i)σ) ,
with Hi the Hamiltonian defined in the statement of the theorem. Applying
Theorem 3 to Hi (note that f˜ is a C1-function of x and ui for each t), we
conclude that there exists a function ψi : T → Rn that is delta differentiable on
T
k, such that ψi(b) = 0,
x∆∗ (t) = H
i
(ψi)σ(t, x∗(t), u
i
∗(t), (ψ
i)σ(t))
= Ax∗(t) +B
1u1∗(t) + · · ·+B
iui∗(t) + · · ·+BNu
N
∗ (t)
= Hi(ψi)σ(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) ,
(ψi)∆(t) = −Hix(t, x∗(t), u
i
∗(t), (ψ
i)σ(t))
= −Hix(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) ,
and Hi
ui
(t, x∗(t), u
i
∗(t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) = Hi
ui
(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) = 0.
Remark 17. Notice that conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 16 simply assert that
x∗ is a solution of the initial value problem (6).
Theorem 18 (Necessary conditions for a linear MPS Nash-equilibrium). Let
ΓN be a N -player delta differential game, where the cost functional of the i-
th player is given by (5). If the decision N -tuple (u1∗(·), . . . , u
N
∗ (·)), given by
(γ1∗(·, xa, x∗(·)), . . . , γ
N
∗ (·, xa, x∗(·))), is a MPS Nash-equilibrium of ΓN and if
x∗(·) is the associated trajectory of the state, then there exist delta differentiable
functions ψi : T → Rn on Tk, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , such that for
Hi(t, x, u1, . . . , uN , (ψi)σ) := Li(t, x, u1, . . . , uN )+(ψi)σ·(Ax+B1u1+· · ·+BNuN )
one has:
1. x∆∗ (t) = H
i
(ψi)σ (t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t));
2. x∗(a) = xa;
3. (ψi)∆(t) = −Hix(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t))
−
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
Hiuj (t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) · γj∗x(t, xa, x∗(t))
(γj∗x denotes the partial derivative of γ
j
∗ with respect to x);
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4. ψi(b) = 0;
5. Hiui(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) = 0;
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N and t ∈ Tk.
Proof. Differently from Theorem 16, now the controls ui depend explicitly on
the state variable x. Suppose that the decision N -tuple (u1∗, . . . , u
N
∗ ) is a MPS
Nash-equilibrium of ΓN , and x∗ is the associated state trajectory. Fix i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}. The same reasoning as used in the proof of Theorem 16 permit
to conclude that (x∗(·), u
i
∗(·)) is a weak local minimizer of problem (7), where
we suppose now that the controls are MPS. In the following we will prove that
min
all admissible MPS controls
J˜ i(ui) = min
all admissible OL controls
J˜ i(ui) . (8)
An OL control can be considered as a MPS control, so it is clear that
min
all admissible MPS controls
J˜ i(ui) ≤ min
all admissible OL controls
J˜ i(ui) .
Since ui∗(t) = γ
i
∗(t, xa, x(t)) is a MPS Nash-equilibrium control, by the assump-
tion of admissibility, the equations x∆(t) = f˜(x(t), γi∗(t, xa, x(t))) and x(a) = xa
define a unique trajectory x∗. With this trajectory we define now the OL control
vi∗(t) := γ
i
∗(t, xa, x∗(t)).
Notice that
J˜ i(vi∗) = min
all admissible MPS controls
J˜ i(ui) ,
and hence equality (8) holds. Observe also that (x∗(·), v
i
∗(·)) is a weak local
minimizer of problem (7). Applying Theorem 3 to Hi, we conclude that there
exists a delta differentiable function ψi : T → Rn on Tk such that
(ψi)∆(t) = −Hix(t, x∗(t), v
i
∗(t), (ψ
i)σ(t))
= −Hix(t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t))
−
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
Hiuj (t, x∗(t), u
1
∗(t), . . . , u
N
∗ (t), (ψ
i)σ(t)) · γj∗x(t, xa, x∗(t)) .
The other conditions are obtained in a similar way.
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